Abstract. Electronic patient records (EPR) information systems maintain the patients' medical information on the web servers, and remain available to the medical institutions, practitioners, and the academia. The transmission of data is being done over the public network, which increases the privacy and security risk. However, authentication mechanism tries to ensure secure and authorized communication over insecure public network. In recent years, several authentication protocols have been proposed, but most of them fail to satisfy desirable security attributes. In this paper, we discuss the failure of two authentication protocols for EPR information systems. To overcome the flows, we present improved scheme for the integrated EPR information systems. The correctness of proposed protocol is proved using BAN logic. Moreover, the protocol performs is comparable and security is efficient than the existing schemes.
Introduction
The advances in network technology have connected the world, where users can access the stored information from the remote servers at any time and from anywhere. This leads to tremendous useful implications in different types of online services, such as e-commerce, e-medicine, e-voting, e-government, e-cash. These services are highly effective and useful in social, consumer, political, civil, business and administrative areas. It has great impact on every aspect of life that drives new innovations to provide convenient on demand services. User and service provider are gradually appreciating the importance and impact of network technology. Now the services can be easy access via electronic devices, such as mobile phones, computer, tablet, etc. Ubiquitous and easy access of network technology also present a scalable platform for e-medicine services. By adopting this technology, most of the medical institutes are developing electronic patient records (EPR) information systems. It is one of the most popular developments in e-medicine which is trying to replace the traditional culture of written and storing medical record of the patient. It is the most useful and important data for a doctor during consultations [24] .
One of the important issue in electronic health records is the patient's privacy [3, 21] . Thus, only authorized user should allow to access the servers. Moreover, medical records is being stored and access via public channel. The health care information is being shared and exchanged between clinicians of all disciplines, across all sectors of health care, different countries and different models of health-care [26] . In addition, the integrated EPR information systems provides the patient records to the doctors, hospitals, medical institute and academia to enhance their decision. It is a tool that will impact the devolvement of doctors and nursing system [9] . Therefore, it is necessary to understand how the patient's records are being controlled and used. Otherwise, EPR information systems without security measure provides full opportunity to an attacker to capture the medical record of all time. Additionally, many entities wish to access this system in a user-friendly way. Thus, the electronic patient record (EPR) systems should ensure userfriendly and authorized access of services.
To protect the medical records, only authorized users should be allowed to access the EPR information systems [10, 12, 16] . In recent time, many smart card based authentication schemes using password have been designed [1, 7, 11, 12, 14-17, 19, 20] . A user is allowed to select his password of his choice to protect security parameters in the smart card. Recently, Wu et al. [28] presented a password based remote user authentication scheme using smart card for integrated EPR information systems. They claimed that their scheme is efficient and secure against various attacks. Although Lee et al. [13] demonstrated that Wu et al.'s scheme is vulnerable against stolen smart card attack and stolen verifier attacks. They also proposed an improved scheme and claimed that their scheme is secure and efficient for integrated EPR information systems.
In this article, we revisit Wu et al.'s scheme and find out that their scheme is vulnerable to some more attacks other than the demonstrated by Lee et al. We point out how inefficient password change phase in Wu et al.'s scheme causes denial of service attack. Then, we briefly review Lee et al.'s scheme and demonstrate its weaknesses to insider attack. Moreover, both the schemes do not protect anonymity, where privacy protection measures increase consumer faith in the system [5] .
Review of Wu et al.'s authentication scheme
Wu et al. [28] scheme has registration, login, verification, and password change phase. The notations used in the scheme is discussed in Table 1 
Registration phase
By registering to the EPR information system, a user achieves personalized smart card.
Step 1. U submits the registration request with ID and P W to S.
Step 2. S checks ID. If verification succeeds, then S computes v = h(K ⊕ ID).
Step 3. S selects a value N and calculates
Step 4. S embeds the parameters {h(·), N, s, P W } into SC. Via secure channel, S issues SC to U .
Login phase
To start the login session, U inputs ID and P W , SC computes the message as.
Step 1 Select random number r 1 and calculate C 1 = h(s ∥ r 1 ) and C 2 = r 1 · P W .
Step 2. Retrieve the saved value N , then send < N, ID, C 1 , C 2 ) > to S.
Verification phase
Step 1. S verifies ID. On success of verification, accepts the user's request and computes
, randomly selects a number r 2 , and then the message pair Step 5. On receiving the message c from U , S verifies c = h(P W ∥ r ′ 1 ∥ r 2 ). If verification succeeds, U is authenticated. Finally, U and S can achieves the session key sk = h(r
Password change phase
A legal user can change the password of the smart card with the help of server as follows:
Step 1. U submits the parameters (ID, P W, P W new ) to S through a secure channel.
Step 2. S computes v = h(K ⊕ ID) and selects new appropriate N * such that 
Insider attack
In Wu et al.'s scheme, user submits his original password to the server, which enable an malicious insider to access user other accounts protected with same password.
User anonymity
During login phase, user sends a login message to server over the public channel including ID. Thus, an attacker can identify the source of message and can track user's activities [25] .
Known session-specific temporary information attack
In this scenario, compromise of short-term keys should not result the compromise of session key. However, in Wu et al.'s scheme using achieve short-term keys r 1 and r 2 , then it can compute session key sk because sk = h(r 1 ∥ r 2 ).
Unfriendly and inefficient password change phase
The user should be able to change his password independently without serve assistance [2, 18, 22] . However, user cannot change his password independently in Wu et al.'s scheme. This provides the opportunity to the attacker to change server's database as follows:
• A can acquire U 's identity from the public channel as U transmits the message via public channel. • On receiving the request,
, and thus verification fails.
The above facts conclude that U can never establish a session with S using N and P W as an attacker can change server's data using password change mechanism.
Inefficient login phase:
Wu et al.'s scheme does not support smart card pre-authentication. Thus, mistake in login phase cannot be identified. The justification is given below:
− Smart card chooses a random number r 1 and computes
− Smart card chooses a random number r 1 to compute 
Review of Lee et al.'s authentication scheme
In 2013, Lee et al. [13] proposed scheme comprises four phases, namely, registration, login, verification and password change.
Registration phase
A user complete his registration as follows: following steps:
Step 1. U submits ID and P W to S via secure channel.
Step 2. S checks the validity of ID. If user is valid, 
Verification phase
The verification phase executes as follows:
Step 1. S verifies the validity of ID. if verification succeeds accepts the request.
Step 2.
, then generates a random number r 2 and computes the message pair (a, b) where a = r 2 ⊕ h(r
Step 5. U and S can generate a common session key sk by sk = h(r
Password change phase
Any legal user U can change the password by using the following steps.
Step 1. U sends the parameters (ID, P W, P W new ) to S through a secure channel.
Step 2. 
Cryptanalysis of Lee et al.'s authentication scheme
Lee et al.'s scheme also faces some kind of attacks as we discuss for Wu et al.'s scheme.
Insider attack
No user anonymity
In Lee et al.'s scheme, an adversary can achieve the user's identity.
Unfriendly and inefficient password change phase
User can not change his password independently, which makes the mechanism unfriendly [23] .
− A can acquire ID when U performs authentication with S, as U uses its original identity during communication with server over the public channel.
to A. − When legal user compute C 1 with password P W and submits his login request < N, ID, C 1 > to S. − On receiving the request, S computes v = h(K ⊕ ID) and s
2 as server has changed N and
and verifies b ′ =? b * , which will fail as neither
The above facts conclude that A can perform denial of service attack such that U can never establish a session with S using N and P W .
Fails to achieve strong login and verification phase:
Lee et al.'s scheme fails to provide strong login phase, which is clear from the following cases: Case 1. In their assumption, user U always enters his correct password P W and does not verify the password in login phase. However, it may not be true in general. U may also enter a wrong password. If U enters his wrong password P W * , in that case also login and verification phase execute as follows:
− Smart card generates r 1 and computes s * 
In both the cases, the message authentication fails in the same steps. Therefore, a user may not identify that it was because of impersonation attack or it's his mistake of inputting wrong password.
Proposed authentication protocol
The proposed scheme is designed to present secure and efficient mechanism for EPR information system. The brief review of protocol is given in figure 1.
Registration phase
A new user completes his registration as:
Step 1. U chooses a random number u and computes I U = h(ID ∥ u) and P U = h(P W ∥ u), Then U submits (ID, I U , P U ) to S via secure channel.
Step 2. On receiving the registration request, S verifies the validity of user identity ID. If ID is invalid, then S denies the request. Otherwise, it generates random values s U and 
Login phase
Step 1. U inputs ID and P W into smart card, then smart card computes u = ID ⊕ P W ⊕ B and verifies V =? ID ⊗ P W ⊗ u. If verification does not hold, it stops the session. Otherwise, SC compute I U = h(ID ∥ u) and P U = h(P W ∥ u).
Step 2. The smart card also computes v = B 1 ⊕ P U , s = B 2 ⊕ P U ⊕ ID, N = B 3 ⊕ P U , and h(v). SC generates a random value r 1 and computes
U is the current timestamp.
Verification phase
On receiving the login request, this phase executes, where the user and server mutually authenticate each other.
Step 1. Upon receiving the message < M 1 >, S retrieves its database and achieves
Step 2. S selects a random number r 2 and computes sk = h(I U ||r 1 ||r 2 ||s||v),
, and sends the message
Step 
Step 4. Upon receiving the message < M 3 >, S computes mac * 2 = h(mac 1 ⊕ r 2 ) and verifies mac 2 =? mac * 2 . If verification succeeds, U is authenticated by S and consider sk as the secret session key.
Password change phase
When a user wishes to change his password, he enters his login identity ID, password P W and new password P W new into smart card. Then, to change the password, smart card works as follows:
Step 1. Execute the operations and achieve u by u = B ⊕ P W ⊕ ID, then verifies V =? ID ⊗ P W ⊗ u. If verification succeeds, then computes I U = h(ID ∥ u) and P U = h(P W ∥ u), and gets v, s and N as: These assumption are used in security analysis:
• The one way hash function h(.) is hard to revert.
• A specific value can not be achieved from XORed output without knowing the other. Proposition 1. The proposed scheme protects anonymity. Proof. In the proposed scheme, user's dynamic ID is used during communication. The user's original identity is first XORed with random value then hashed with one way hash function, which is hard to revert. This dynamic identity mechanism helps to protect user anonymity. Moreover, an attacker cannot identify with which server a user is communicating, as server identity and public keys are also not associated with the message. Proposition 2. The proposed scheme resists stolen smart card attack.
Proof. An attacker can retrieve the information < B 1 , B 2 ⊕ ID, B 3 , B, V > from the smart card. In smart card the values v, s, N are XORed with P U = h(P W ∥ u). Therefore, to achieve v, s and N , an adversary has to achieve P W and u. However, P W and u can not be uniquely retrieve from B = ID ⊕ P W ⊕ u, as ID is secret. Moreover, no value can be retrieved uniquely from the NAND (×) output. This shows that an adversary cannot achieve the secret values using the stolen smart card.
Proposition 3. The proposed scheme withstands password guessing attack. Proof. In general, existing systems suffer two kinds of password guessing attacks, one is online password guessing and other is offline password guessing attacks.
An active adversary may try to execute online password by continuously tries to login to the server by guessing the possible passwords until the success. As to generates a login message v is needed, where v = B 1 ⊕ P U , i.e, online password guessing is equivalent to compute P U using guessed password. This will not work as follows:
• Guess a password P W * .
• Try to retrieve u from B = ID ⊕ P W ⊕ u. Since, ID is secret, only password guessing will not work.
• Try to retrieve u from V = ID × P W × u. Since, no value can be uniquely retrieved from the NAND (×) output, an adversary cannot retrieve u from V .
This shows that the proposed scheme resist online password guessing attack. An adversary may try to verify the guessed password using the off-line password guessing attack as follows:
• Try to verify guessed password with mac = h(I U ||C 1 ||C 2 ||s||T ′ U ), for that an adversary has to compute P * U = h(P W * ||u) with the guessed password, as s = B 2 ⊕ ID ⊕ P U .
• Try to retrieve u and ID from B = ID ⊕ P W ⊕ u, i.e, compute B ⊕ P W * = ID * ⊕ u * . However, to verify guessed password with V = ID × P W × u, ID and u is needed not ID * ⊕ u * .
The discussion shows that an adversary cannot verify the guessed value using the password guessing attack.
Proposition 4. The proposed scheme is efficient to resist stolen verifier attacks. Proof. In stolen verifier attack, some malicious insiders can steal user's related information from the the server's database. In the proposed scheme, the server stores the value H corresponding to I U in its secure database. An malicious insider can steal a copy of the verifier {H, h(.), I U } from S's database and try to make communication vulnerable to attack between user and server. However, the stolen value H will not provide any information to the adversary, as H = v⊕s⊕N , and v, s and N are unknown to an adversary.
Proposition 5. The proposed scheme presents efficient login phase. Proof. The proposed scheme is efficient to identify incorrect login attempt: Case 1. On receiving wrong identity ID * and right password P W .
• SC calculates u
Case 2. On receiving ID and incorrect password P W * .
• SC computes u
Case 3. On incorrect identity ID * and password P W * .
•
The above discussion shows that smart card can identify the incorrect input.
Proposition 6. The proposed scheme presents user-friendly and efficient password changes phase. Proof. In the proposed scheme, the user can change his password freely without server assistance. Moreover, the smart card verifies the correctness of inputs with the condition V =? ID ⊗ P W ⊗ u in the similar way as demonstrated in login phase i.e., efficiency of password change phase is equivalent to the efficiency of the login phase in incorrect input detection. Since, the login phase can correctly verifies the correctness of input, the password change phase is also efficient.
Proposition 7. The proposed scheme withstands replay attack. Proof. The common countermeasures for replay attack are random number and timestamp. We adopt timestamp as a counter measure. Each session usages a fresh timestamp and each transmitted login message includes timestamp. Moreover, to modify the login message according to the new timestamp T E , an adversary has to calculate mac = h(I U ||C 1 ||C 2 ||s||T E ), which requires the knowledge of s. Since, s is protected with password and password is unknown to the adversary, the adversary can not modify previously transmitted message. This shows that the proposed scheme resists replay attack.
Proposition 8. The proposed scheme supports mutual authentication. Proof. To ensure the correctness of the user, the server checks the condition mac = h(I U ||C 1 ||C 2 ||s||T ′ U ). And, to verify the correctness of the server, the user checks the condition mac 1 = h(I U ||C 3 ||sk||T ′ U ). To compute mac and mac 1 , secret value s is needed. Since the value s is secret, a legal user and the server can only compute and verify the condition. This shows that the proposed scheme support mutual authentication.
Proposition 9. The proposed scheme supports session key verification. Proof. User and server both verify the session key mac 1 = h(I U ||C 3 ||sk * ||T ′ U ) and mac 2 = h(mac 1 ⊕ r 2 ). Moreover, no adversary can forge this value, as to compute sk = h(I U ||r 1 ||r 2 ||s||v), secret value s and v are needed. Therefore, both user and server can correctly verify the session key.
Proposition 10. The proposed scheme ensures known key secrecy. Proof. If an adversary achieves some past session keys then he may try to extract some information from the compromised session key to construct other session keys [8] . Although compromised session key does not provide any information, which can helpful to compute other session keys, as each session key is the hashed output of one way hash function, which cannot be reverted. Therefore, no information can be extracted from session key. In addition, each session key involves random session keys r 1 and r 2 , which are different for different sessions.
Proposition 11. The proposed scheme achieves forward security. Proof. If the user's long term secret key v compromised. Although an adversary cannot compute the session key with the compromised session key as follows:
• Key sk = h(I U ||r 1 ||r 2 ||s||v).
• The attacker can compute r 1 and r 2 from C 1 = v ⊕ r 1 and C 3 = v ⊕ r 2 using v.
• The attacker can achieve P U from B 1 = v ⊕ P U using v.
• The attacher can not achieve s from s ⊕ P U ⊕ ID, as ID is secret.
Since, an adversary cannot compute the value s, the adversary cannot compute the session key sk = h(I U ||r 1 ||r 2 ||s||v) as it is the hashed output of v, r 1 and r 2 along with s.
Performance Analysis
In table 2, we discussed the security of related schemes with the proposed scheme, where symbol × demonstrates that the scheme does not prevent the attack and √ demonstrate that scheme prevents the attack. It is clear from the Table 2 that proposed scheme present efficient and secure solution. We show the efficiency analysis of proposed schemes with similar schemes based on smart card, namely, Wu et al. [28] and Lee et al. [13] in Table 3 . Let, output and input size of h(.), identity ID, password P W , random number 128-bits. 
